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The Income Tax Status of University
Employees' Tuition Assistance Programs

I.

Introduction

The Tax Reform Act of 1984 amended § 1171 of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1954 to exclude from income any qualified tuition
reduction given by universities to their employees. The exclusion applies to employees and their children who attend the university
where the employee works or any other university the child attends.
Prior to the amendment, courts included in gross income any
payments made directly from one university to another on behalf of
an employee. 2 The courts also taxed any payments made directly
from a university to reimburse employees for the tuition cost of sending their children to other universities.3 These decisions were based
on a regulation that permitted employee exclusions only if a university participated in a tuition remission plan. 4 In a tuition remission
plan, tuition is simply not charged to the employee as opposed to the
employing university making payments on behalf of the employee. 5
Since the amendment in 1984, there have been no cases concerning tuition assistance programs. It is unclear whether the
amendment merely codified prior case law or broadened it to permit
university employees to exclude from income tuition payments made
by their employer to another university. In seeking to resolve the
question, this Comment reviews the history of § 117. It then describes the "primary purpose test" courts have used when examining
payments characterized as scholarships. Section IV applies § 117 to
payments made by a university on behalf of its employees. Section V
analyzes § 117 as amended by the Tax Reform Act of 1984 and
compares in kind versus in cash benefits. This Comment concludes
I. I.R.C § 117 (1954). See infra note 12 for full text of § 117 of the Internal Revenue
Code of 1954. See infra note 94 and accompanying text for § 117 as amended by the Tax
Reform Act of 1984.
2. See Knapp v. Commissioner, 867 F.2d 749 (2d Cir. 1989). See infra notes 77-128
and accompanying text for a complete analysis of payments made from one university to another on behalf of its employees.
3. See Western Reserve Academy v. United States, 619 F. Supp. 394 (N.D. Ohio 1988),
aff'd, 801 F.2d 250 (6th Cir. 1986). See infra notes 69-76 and accompanying text for a complete analysis of payments made to reimburse tuition costs of employees.
4. Treas. Reg. § 1.1 17-3 (1961). See infra note 23 and accompanying text for a discussion of tuition remission programs.
5. Treas. Reg. § 1.117-3 (1961).
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by stating that Congress intended § 117 to exclude from income payments made directly from one university to another on behalf of its
employees.6
II.

History

The Internal Revenue Code of 1939 provided no specific provision concerning scholarships.7 For scholarship grants to be excluded
from the gross income of a taxpayer, they had to fall within the
broad provision that excluded gifts from income.8 A gift was required to be made from a "detached and disinterested generosity." 9
Congress criticized the gift standard for providing "no clear-cut
method of distinguishing between taxable and nontaxable [scholarship] grants."'" The difficulty involved in distinguishing these grants
resulted in the need to determine their tax status on a case-by-case

basis."
In an attempt to end the confusion surrounding the tax status of
6. This Comment does not address the tax consequences to an employer for providing
payments on behalf of its employee's children in the form of tuition assistance programs. In
Greensboro Pathology Assoc. v. United States, 698 F.2d 1196 (Fed. Cir. 1982), the court
examined whether payments made by an employee to an, educatioral benefit plan for the children of its employees was deductible by the employer. Id. at 1197. The benefits were available
to all employees. Id. at 1203. The employer provided the benefits at a set figure and not upon a
percentage of the company's earnings. Id. Moreover, employees whose children did not participate in the program did not receive any extra monetary compensation. Id. The receipt of the
benefits was not linked to the salary of an employee. Id. Although the employer instituted the
plan to attract and retain qualified employees, the court held the educational benefit plan was
not deferred compensation, but was rather a welfare benefit plan. Id. Since the benefits were
considered a welfare benefit plan, the payments to the plan were deductible to the employer.
Id. See also I.R.C. § 162 (1990) (deductions allowed to an employer for all ordinary and
necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or business); I.R.C. § 404 (1990) (deductions not allowed if contributions are made "by an employer
to or under a stock bonus, pension, profit sharing, or annuity plan, or if compensation is paid
or accrued on account of any employee under a plan deferring the receipt of such
compensation").
7. Bingler v. Johnson, 394 U.S. 741, 752 (1969).
8. id. Section 22(b)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code provided that "[t]he value of property acquired by gift, bequest, devise, or inheritance" is excluded from gross income. I.R.C. §
22(b)(3) (1939). Cases decided under the gift approach "generally involved two types of financial assistance: grants to research or teaching assistants - graduate students who perform
research to teaching services in return for their stipends - and. foundation grants to postdoctoral researchers." Bingler, 394 U.S. at 752. See generally Stone v. Commissioner, 23 T.C.
254, 262 (1954) (grant considered a scholarship because its purpose was to "facilitate the
further education or training of the recipient" and therefore qualified as a gift excludable
under § 22(b)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939); cf. Ti Li Loo v. Commissioner, 22
T.C. 220 (1954) (fellowship grant received by chemist in exchange for execution of a specific
research project held not excludable under § 22(b)(3)).
9. Commissioner v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278, 285 (1960) (quoting Commissioner v.
LoBue, 351 U.S. 243, 246 (1955)).
10. Reese v. Commissioner, 45 T.C. 407, 412 (1966) (quoting H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d
Cong., 2d Sess., at 16 (1954)), aff'd, 373 F.2d 742 (4th Cir. 1967).
11. Id. at 412 (quoting HR. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., at 16 (1954)).
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scholarships, Congress enacted § 11712 of the Internal Revenue Code
of 1954.13 Section 117 excluded from gross income any amount received as a scholarship at an educational institution14 or any amount
received as a fellowship grant. 15 If the individual receiving the scholarship was a candidate for degree, any sum of money received that

represented payment for services required as a condition to receiving
the scholarship was not excluded from income."6 But if all students
receiving a degree were required to perform such services, that sum
was considered a scholarship and excluded from income. 7 There
were also certain limitations for individuals that were not candidates
for degrees.' 8
12.

13.
14.
15.
16.
17,
18.

I.R.C. § 117 (1954) provides:
Scholarships and fellowship grants
(a) General rule. - In the case of an individual, gross income does not
include(1) any amount received(A) as a scholarship at an educational institution (as defined in
section 151(e)(4), or
(B) as a fellowship grant, including the value of contributed services and accommodations and
(2) any amount received to cover expenses for(A) travel,
(B) research,
(C) clerical help, or
(D) equipment,
which are incident to such a scholarship or to a fellowship grant,
but only to the extent that the amount is so expended by the
recipient.
(b) Limitations.(1) Individuals who are candidates for degrees. - In the case of
an individual who is a candidate for a degree at an educational
institution (as defined in section 151(e)(4)), subsection (a) shall
not apply to that portion of any amount received which represents
payment for teaching, research, or other services in the nature of
part-time employment required as a condition to receiving the
scholarship or the fellowship grant. If teaching, research, or other
services are required of all candidates (whether or not recipients of
scholarships or fellowship grants) for a particular degree as a condition to receiving such degree, such teaching, research, or other
services shall not be regarded as part-time employment within the
meaning of this paragraph.
(2) Individuals who are not candidates for degrees.-In the case of
an individual who is not a candidate for a degree at an educational
institution (as defined in section 151(e)(4)), subsection (a) shall
apply only if the condition in subparagraph (A) is satisfied and
then only within the limitations provided in subparagraph (B).
Id.
I.R.C. § I17(a)(l)(A) (1954).
I.R.C. § 117(a)(l)(B) (1954).
I.R.C. § 117(b)(1) (1954).
Id.
I.R.C. § I17(b)(2) (1954). See supra note 12 for text of statute.
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Although Congress' goal was to eliminate confusion,19 it is questionable whether they achieved this goal. The term "scholarship"
was not defined nor was there any mention of the treatment to be
given to tuition assistance or remission programs.20 Fortunately,
Treasury Regulations were promulgated in an attempt to clear up
any ambiguity. 2 ' Treasury Regulation § 1.117 defined a scholarship
as generally "an amount paid or allowed to, or for the benefit of a
student, whether undergraduate or graduate, to aid such individual
in pursuing his studies. 22 In reference to tuition remission plans, the
regulation provided:
If an educational institution maintains or participates in a plan
whereby the tuition of a child of a faculty member of such institution is remitted by any other participating educational institution attended by such child, the amount of the tuition so remitted shall be considered to be an amount received as a
23
scholarship.

Standing alone, the Treasury Regulation excluding tuition remission programs from gross income presents no controversy. The
controversy arises, however, when § 6124 of the Internal Revenue
Code is compared with Treasury Regulation § 1.117. Section 61 defines gross income as "income from whatever source derived," including compensation for services in the form of fringe benefits.2 5
Treasury Regulation § 1.11 7-4(c) 2" states that any amounts "paid as
19. Reese v. Commissioner, 45 T.C. 407, 412 (1966), aff'd, 373 F.2d 742 (4th Cir.
1967).
20. See I.R.C. § 117 (1954).
21. "Regulations 'must be sustained unless unreasonable and plainly inconsistent with
the revenue statutes,' and 'should not be overruled except for weighty reasons.' " Bingler v.
Johnson, 394 U.S. 741, 750 (1968) (quoting Commissioner v. South Tex. Lumber Co., 333
U.S. 496, 501 (1948)). The United States Supreme Court does not "sit as a committee of
revision to perfect the administration of the tax laws." United States v. Correll, 389 U.S. 299,
306-07 (1967). It is the role of the Commissioner to prescribe the rules and regulations necessary for the enforcement of the Internal Revenue Code. Id. at 307. "The role of the judiciary
. . .begins and ends with assuring that the Commissioner's regulations fall within his authority to implement the congressional mandate in some reasonable manner." Id.
22. Treas. Reg. § 1.117-3 (1961).
23. Id.
24. I.R.C. § 61 (1990).
25. I.R.C. § 61(a)(1) (1990).
26. Treas. Reg. § 1.117-4(c) (1961). Items not considered as scholarships or fellowship
grants include:
(c) Amounts paid as compensation for services or primarily for the benefit of the
grantor. (I) Except as provided in paragraph (a) of § 1.117-2, any amount paid
or allowed to, or on behalf of, an individual to enable him to pursue studies or
research, if such amount represents either compensation for past, present, or future employment services or represents payment for services which are subject to
the direction or supervision of the grantor. (2) Any amount paid or allowed to,
or on behalf of, an individual to enable him to pursue studics or research primar-
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compensation for services or primarily for the benefit of the grantor"
are not considered scholarships.2 7
It is readily apparent that fringe benefits in the form of tuition
remission provided to employees of colleges and universities may be
considered compensation for services rendered and therefore included in gross income. This exemption has been criticized as providing preferential treatment to faculty and other employees of colleges
and universities.2 8 But by carving out this exception to gross income,
Congress is "promoting higher education by encouraging qualified
people to enter and to remain in the academic teaching profession
29
despite low earnings.
Before beginning an analysis of the law surrounding § 117 of
the Internal Revenue Code, it should be recognized that providing
university employees with the opportunity to participate in tuition
remission plans, or allowing an employee's child to attend a university at no cost, is not covered by the statute excluding certain employee fringe benefits from gross income.3" A common misconception
may be that this fringe benefit is a "no-additional cost service" provided by an employer to an employee. 3 A fringe benefit will be excluded from income if the employer offers the same service to its
ily for the benefit of the grantor.
Id.
27. Id.
28. Wendy Gerzog Shaller, The New Fringe Benefit Legislation: A Codification of Historical Inequities, 34 CATH. U.L. REV. 425, 427 (1985). The author also criticizes the preferential treatment accorded airline and retail industry employees as a result of the fringe benefit
legislation in the Tax Reform Act of 1984. Id.
29. Wheeler v. United States, 768 F.2d 1333, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474
U.S. 1081 (1986). The court is offering a rational basis to explain Congress' decision to exempt tuition remission programs from gross income. Id.
30. I.R.C. § 132 (1990)
§ 132. Certain fringe benefits
(a) Exclusion from gross income.-Gross income shall not include any
fringe benefit which qualifies as a(1) no-additional-cost service.
(2) qualified employee discount,
(3) working condition fringe, or
(4) de minimis fringe.
(b) No-additional-cost service defined.-For purposes of this section, the
term "no-additional-cost service" means any service provided by an employer to an employee for use by such employee if(1) such service is offered for sale to customers in the ordinary
course of the line of business of the employer in which the employee is performing services, and
(2) the employer incurs no substantial additional cost (including
forgone revenue) in providing such service to the employee (determined without regard to any amount paid by the employee for
such service).
31. I.R.C. § 132(a)(1) (1990).
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customers in the ordinary course of business.3 2 The employer must
incur "no substantial additional cost" in providing the service to its
employees, including foregone revenues.3 3 An example of a "no additional cost service" is an airline allowing its employees to fly free of
charge when a flight is not filled to capacity. In this instance, there is
no foregone revenue by the employer.
The same rationale cannot be applied to colleges and universities. A student that is not charged tuition is not simply occupying a
space that would otherwise have been vacant. If the student had not
attended this college, another would surely have taken his or her
place, and the- university would have received the full tuition price.
The university has clearly foregone revenue by not charging a student tuition. Because the university has foregone revenue, this benefit cannot be considered a "no additional cost service."
111.

Primary Purpose Test

The primary purpose test determines whether the payment is to
"further the education and training of the recipient or . . . for services which directly benefitted another person." 4 The benefit to the
grantor is not limited to monetary gain.35 The payment may not further any noneducational purpose of the grantor.3 6
The United States Supreme Court first examined § 117 of the
Internal Revenue Code of 1954 in Bingler v. Johnson.3 The Court
examined whether payments received from their employer by employees on educational leave from the corporation were excludable
from income.38 The Third Circuit questioned the validity of the pri32. I.R.C. § 132(b)(l) (1990).
33. I.R.C. § 132(b)(2) (1990).
34. Reese v. Commissioner, 45 T.C. 397, 410 (1966), aird, 373 F.2d 742 (4th Cir.
1967). "The primary purpose standard relates to the purpose for which the payments are
made, not to the [stated] purpose of the grantor." Krupin v. United States, 439 F. Supp. 440,
444 (E.D. Mo. 1977).
35. Rev. Proc. 76-47, 1976-2 C.B. 670. See infra note 153 for cases concerning payment
benefitting persons other than the recipient.
36. Id.
37. 394 U.S. 741, 742 (1968). The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve inconsistent holdings between the Third and Fifth Circuits of the United States Court of Appeals. In
Ussery v. United States, the Fifth Circuit held that payments made by an employer to a
person granted an educational leave from his regular employment were not excludable from
income. 296 F.2d 582, 586 (5th Cir. 1961). In Johnson v. Bingler, the Third Circuit held that
payments very similar to those in Ussery were excludable from income. Johnson v. Bingler,
396 F.2d 258, 260-61 (3d Cir. 1968), rev'd, 394 U.S. 741 (1969).
38. Bingler, 394 U.S. at 741. The taxpayers in this case were engineers that participated
in a two-phase Fellowship and Doctoral Program subsidized by Westinghouse Electric Corporation. Id. at 742. During the first phase, the employees held regular jobs at Westinghouse and
attended university classes on a part-time basis. Id. at 743. Westinghouse paid the employees'
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mary purpose test 3a and stated that the goal of § 117 was to "encourage financial aid to education through tax relief."" ° The court
concluded the payments qualified as scholarships and excluded them
from gross income.4 1 In addition, the court also held that Treasury
Regulation § 1.117, which required the inclusion of such payments
in income, was invalid.4"
The Supreme Court reversed and upheld the validity of the
Regulation." The Court stated that "[r]egulations must be sustained
unless unreasonable and plainly inconsistent with the revenue statutes." 44 Since Congress intended to tax amounts received by parttime teaching assistants,4" it was reasonable to assume that Congress
intended to tax amounts that actually represented compensation for
services performed. 4 The primary purpose of the employer in Bingler was not to educate the recipient but to extract a quid pro quo
from its employee.47 The employee was required to hold a position
with the corporation during the "educational leave" period and was
obligated to return upon completion of the leave.4 The thrust of the
Regulation is to tax payments that are "given only as a quo in return for the quid of services rendered - whether past, present, or
future."4 9
The primary purpose test has been used to deny medical residents an exclusion for any payments made to them. 50 It is a common
practice for hospitals to give medical residents stipends to help defray costs while conducting the required internship. 5 During the internship programs, however, the residents perform duties similar to
duties performed by other physicians at the hospital. These duties
tuition for the classes attended. Id. During the second phase, the employees took an educational leave of absence to work on a doctoral dissertation. Id. Westinghouse paid the employees
a stipend of up to 90% of the employee's prior salary while they were on educational leave. Id.
The employees claimed the tuition payments and stipends qualified as scholarships and therefore were excludable under § 117 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954. Id. at 742.
39. Johnson, 396 F.2d at 263. See supra notes 34-36 and accompanying text for description of primary purpose test.
40. Id. at 262.
41. Id. at 263.
42. Johnson v. Bingler, 396 F.2d 258, 260 (3d Cir. 1968), rev'd, 394 U.S. 741 (1969).
See also supra note 26 for text of Treas. Reg. § 1.117-4 (1961).
43. Bingler v. Johnson, 394 U.S. 741, 751 (1969).
44. Id. at 750.
45. I.R.C § 117(d) (1984).
46. Bingler, 394 U.S. at 754.
47. Bingler v. Johnson, 394 U.S. 741, 757 (1969).
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Burstein v. United States, 622 F.2d 529, 535 (Ct. Cl. 1980).
51. See Meek v. United States, 608 F.2d 368, 370 (9th Cir. 1979).
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include giving physical examinations, recording medical histories,
and writing orders for treatment and diagnostic tests. 52 In effect residents benefit the hospital by performing substantial services that
complement the services performed by the hospital staff.53
When examining these stipends, courts have looked to the value
of the services received by the hospital."' Although a resident may
receive valuable educational experience, the hospital, in turn, gains a

service of compensable value.55 The primary purpose of hospitals in
granting these stipends is not to educate the intern, but to extract a
substantial quid pro quo from the students. 56 Therefore, the stipends
are not excluded from gross income under § 117.51
The primary purpose test has also been utilized to determine if
tuition payments made by corporations on behaif of their employees
are excluded from gross income under § 117 .5 Under this type of
plan, a company makes payments to a trustee, usually a bank, and
the trustee distributes the funds according to the agreement. 59 These
funds are generally not refundable to the corporation.6 0
A child's eligibility depends solely on the batsis of his or her parent's employment with the company.61 A company incorporates these
plans to attract new talent and remain competitive in its area of business." The payments 63
are issued either to the child or directly to an
educational institution. If the parent discontinues employment with
52. Id.
53. Cooney v. United States, 630 F.2d 438, 440 (6th Cir. 1980).
54. Burstein, 622 F.2d at 536.
55. Burstein v. United States, 622 F.2d 529, 535 (Ct. Cl. 1980). See also Cooney v.
United States, 630 F.2d 438 (6th Cir. 1980); Meek v. United States, 608 F.2d 368 (9th Cir.
1979): Krupin v. United States, 439 F. Supp. 440 (E.D. Mo. 1977); Yarlott v. Commissioner
78 T.C. 585 (1982), aft'd, 717 F.2d 439 (1983).
56. Burstein, 622 F.2d at 535.
57. But see Mitzell v. United States, 663 F.2d 772 (8th Cir. 1981). Medical residents
received stipends similar to those that had been consistently denied as exclusions from income
under § 117. Id. at 775. The case was tried to a jury and the appellate court refused to reverse
the "jury's determination of a factual question where the verdict (was) supported by substantial evidence." Id. at 776. The jury's decision to exclude the stipends from income was therefore upheld, but the court noted that facts indicative of compensation existed in the case. Id. at
777. The court was "also concerned that the result reached in the district court [would] somewhat impede uniformity and predictability in this area of the law." Id.
58. See generally Armantrout v. Commissioner, 570 F.2d 210 (7th Cir. 1978) (holding
that payments made by corporation to educational benefit plan to assist key employees in
defraying the cost of children's education are not excludable from gross income); GrantJacoby v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 700 (1980) (holding that payments made by corporation to
an educational benefit plan to assist key employees in defraying the cost of children's education are not excludable from gross income).
59. Armantrout, 570 F.2d at 211; Grant-Jacoby, 73 T.C. at 703.
60. Grant-Jacoby, 73 T.C. at 703.
61. Id.
62. Armantrout, 570 F.2d at 212; Grant-Jacoby, 73 T.C. at 702.
63. Grant-Jacoby v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 700, 704 (1980).
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the company, participation in the plan is terminated.14
Since the right to receive payment is directly linked to the parent's employment and the primary purpose of the grant is to attract
new employees, the grants are included in gross income under
§ 117.6 5 The benefits received by employees represent additional
compensation in a form other than cash. 6 If an employer-employee
relationship exists, the relationship immediately suggests that the
grant is made for compensatory reasons.67 Moreover, it is not important that payments are never directly received by the employees because "the first principle of income taxation [is] that income must be
6' 8
taxed to him who earns it."
IV.

Application of § 117 to Tuition Payments Made by Universi-

ties on Behalf of Their Employees
A.

Payments Made Directly to Employees

9 the court exIn Western Reserve Academy v. United States,"
amined whether payments made by a secondary school directly to
employees to reimburse tuition costs were excludable under § 117 of
the Internal Revenue Code. 70 The purpose of the program was to
enable the school to effectively compete with other "schools for quality teachers by assisting the faculty in meeting the undergraduate
tuition of their children. 7 1 Citing Treasury Regulation § 1.117, the
employees argued that Congress intended to exclude from income
any tuition assistance awards made within the setting of an educational institution. 72 The court disagreed and concluded the payments
were not scholarships.73 It defined a tuition remittance plan as a
"plan whereby the children of faculty of the schools participating in
the plan have their tuition canceled when attending any other educational institutions in the plan other than the institution at which
74
their parent is a faculty member.
64. Id. at 703.
65. Id. at 710.
66. Id. at 708.
67. Bingler v. Johnson, 394 U.S. 741, 756-57 (1969).
68. Commissioner v. Culbertson, 337 U.S. 733, 739-40 (1949). The employees in
Armantrout argued "that the children, rather than the parents, should pay the income taxes
on the educational benefits provided." Armantrout v. Commissioner, 570 F.2d 210, 212 (7th
Cir. 1978).
69. 619 F. Supp. 394 (N.D. Ohio 1985), aff'd, 801 F.2d 250 (6th Cir. 1986).
70. Id. at 397.
71. Id. at 396.
72. Id. at 398.
73. Id. at 400.
74. Western Reserve Academy v. United States, 619 F. Supp. 394, 398 (N.D. Ohio
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The dispositive fact in finding that tuition assistance awards are
not the same as tuition remission plans is that cash payments are
made directly from the university to the employee. 75 The tuition as-

sistance is considered part of a compensation package designed to
attract and retain qualified employees. 76 Thus, tuition assistance
awards paid in cash directly to employees are riot excludable under
§ 117 although they accomplish the same goal as tuition remission
plans: To relieve employees from the burden of paying their children's tuition.
B. Payments Made Directly from Employing University to University Attended by Employee's Child
7
the court examined whether payIn Knapp v. Commissioner,1
ments made directly from one university to another on behalf of the
university's employees were scholarships under § 117 of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1954.78 No written agreement existed between the

two universities to remit tuition of faculty members' children. 79 The

purpose of the program was to compete with other area universities
in the area by attracting qualified faculty.80
As in Western Reserve Academy, the employees in Knapp argued that "Congress intended to treat all tuition assistance payments
by educational institutions, including employing institutions, for the
benefit of the children of faculty members as non-taxable."'" They
reasoned that Congress "could have no basis for distinguishing between unilateral waivers of tuition between institutions and direct
'
The employees
payments by one institution to another institution." 82
never argued that the tuition assistance grants, were not compensation.8" The employees instead based their argument solely on the exception to income Congress carved out by enacting § 117.84 Relying
1985), aff-d, 801 F.2d 250 (6th Cir. 1986). The court questioned, however, "whether there
[was] any congressional mandate which would allow the promulgation of a regulation which
defines tuition remittance programs as scholarships." Id. at 399 n.5.
75. Id. at 399.
76. Id. at 398.
77. Knapp v. Commissioner, 90 T.C. 430 (1988), affd, 867 F.2d 749 (2d Cir. 1989).
Although the case was decided in 1988, the payments in dispute occurred in 1979. Id. at 430.
Thus, the case was decided under § 117 as it existed in the Internal Revenue Code of 1954. Id.
78. Id. at 430.
79. Id. at 433.
80. Id. at 432.
81. Knapp v. Commissioner, 867 F.2d 749, 752 (2d Cir. 1989).
82. Knapp v. Commissioner, 90 T.C. 430, 434 (1988), affd, 867 F.2d 749 (2d Cir.
1989).
83. Id.
84. Knapp, 867 F.2d at 751.
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on Treasury Regulation § 1.11 7-3a, the appellate court concluded
the payments were not scholarships.85 The dispositive fact was that
the tuition assistance awards were not tuition waivers, but were actually cash payments made by a university to benefit its own employees.86 Since the payments made directly from one university to another are compensatory in nature and linked to the parent's
employment at the university, they are not scholarships under
§ 117.11 But these tuition assistance awards accomplish the same
goal as the tuition remission awards: To relieve the university employees from the burden of paying their children's tuition. By including these payments in gross income, the court clearly stressed form
over substance.
Knapp v. Commissioner is the only case concerning payments
made from one university to another in the form of tuition assistance
to employees. "The policy which Congress intended to implement by
including tuition remission plans as scholarships is not stated in leg' Tuition payments from one university to another
islative history." 88
have historically not been taxed. 89 It is not clear whether this is a
result of deliberate forbearance on the part of the Commissioner or a
failure of employees of educational institutions to report the payments. 90 The outcome is that-the Commissioner had never taxed tuition assistance programs of this kind prior to Knapp.91
In the Tax Reform Act of 1984, Congress amended and broadened the scope of § 117.92 No cases concerning tuition assistance
payments made after 1984 exist, and Treasury Regulation § 1.117
remains unchanged. 9 3 The question to be addressed is whether tuition assistance awards in the form of direct payments by one university to another are included as scholarships under the current scope
of§ 117.
V. Tax Reform Act of 1984
In the Tax Reform Act of 1984, Congress amended § 117 to
85.
86.
87.
1989).
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

Id. at 751-52.
Knapp, 90 T.C. at 435-36.
Knapp v. Commissioner, 90 T.C. 430, 436 (1988), affd, 867 F.2d 749 (2d Cir.
Id. at 435.
Knapp v. Commissioner, 867 F.2d 749, 753 (2d Cir. 1989).
Id. at 753 n.1.
Id. at 753.
98 Stat. 369, 887 (1984).
Treas. Reg. § 1.117 (1990).
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exempt from gross income qualified tuition reductions.94 A qualified
tuition reduction is defined as the amount of any reduction in tuition
provided to an employee of a university at the university he or she is
employed or at any other university.9 5 This exemption is available
not only to the employee but to any individual the Internal Revenue
Service treats as an employee.9 6 This includes spouses, children, wid97
ows and retired or disabled employees.
Congress also placed a non-discrimination requirement on the
qualified tuition reduction exclusion.9 8 If a university only permits
faculty or other highly compensated employees to participate in the
tuition reduction programs, the reductions are not excluded from the
employees' gross income. 99 A university must offer this benefit across
the board, from the cafeteria employees to the president of the
school, for the reduction to be exempt under the amended version of
94.

98 Stat. 369, 887 (1984).
SEC. 535. EXCLUSION OF CERTAIN REDUCTIONS IN TUITION
FROM GROSS INCOME
(a) IN GENERAL-Section 117 (relating to scholarships and fellowship grants) is amended by adding at the end thereof the following new
subsection:
(d) QUALIFIED TUITION REDUCTIONS,(1)IN GENERAL-Gross income shall not include any qualified
tuition reduction.
(2) QUALIFIED TUITION REDUCTION.-For purposes of this
subsection, the term 'qualified tuition reduction' means the amount of any
reduction in tuition provided to an employee of an organization described
in section 170(b)(1)(A)(ii) for the education (below the graduate level)
at such organization (or another organization described in section
170(b)(I )(A)(ii)) of(A) such employee, or
(B) any person treated as an employee (or whose uso is treated as an
employee use)under the rules of section 132(f).
(3) REDUCTION MUST NOT DISCRIMINATE IN FAVOR
OF HIGHLY COMPENSATED, ETC.-Paragraph (I) shall apply with
respect to any qualified tuition reduction provided with respect to any
officer, owner,or highly compensated employee only if such reduction is
available on substantially the same terms to each member of a group of
employees which is defined under a reasonable classification set up by the
employer which does not discriminate in favor of officers, owners, or
highly compensated employees.
95. Although the term "university" is used, the text of § 117(d) states that this benefit is
exempt from income if provided to an employee of an "organization described in section
170(b)(1)(A)(ii) for the education . . . at such organization (or another organization described in section 170(b)(I )(A)(ii))." I.R.C. § I17(d) (1984). This includes "an educational
organization which normally maintains a regular faculty and curriculum and normally has a
regularly enrolled body of pupils or students in attendance at the place where its educational
activities are regularly carried on." I.R.C. § 170(b)(1)(A)(ii) (1984).
96. I.R.C. § 117(d)(I)(A)(B) (1984).
97. I.R.C. § 132(f) (1984).
98. I.R.C. § 117(d)(3) (1984).
99. Id.
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§ 117.100
A.

In Kind v. In Cash Benefit

The most compelling argument for including tuition assistance
payments made directly from one university to another in gross income may be that the benefits are made in cash rather than in kind.
An appropriate analysis includes an examination of the treatment
given to cash payments claimed as exclusions from gross income pursuant to § 119 of the Internal Revenue Code.1"' Section 119 excludes from an employee's gross income meals or lodging furnished
for the convenience of the employer to employees, spouses, or dependents. 10 2 Meals can be excluded from gross income only if they are
provided on the employer's business premises.10 3 If lodging is provided by the employer, it must be on the premises of the business
and must be a condition of employment to be excluded from gross
income."'
In Commissioner v. Kowalski,10 5 the United States Supreme
Court examined whether cash payments made to state troppers and
designated as meal allowances were gross income within the meaning
of § 6110 of the Internal Revenue Code.10 7 The state troopers
claimed the payments were excludable pursuant to § 119.108
However, many features of the meal allowances were inconsistent with the trooper's characterization of the payments as reim100. Id.
101.
§ 119. Meals or lodging furnished for the convenience of the employer
(a) Meals or lodging furnished to employee, his spouse,and his dependents, pursuant to employment.-There shall be excluded from gross income of an employee the value of any meals or lodging furnished to him,
his spouse, or any of his dependents by or on behalf of his employer for
the convenience of the employer, but only if(1) in the case of meals, the meals are furnished on the business
premises of the employer, or
(2) in the case of lodging, the employee is required to accept such
lodging on the business premises of his employer as a condition of
his employment.
I.R.C. § 119 (1984).
102. I.R.C. § 119(a) (1984).
103. I.R.C. § 119(a)(1) (1984).
104. I.R.C. § 119(a)(2) (1984).
105. 434 U.S. 77 (1977).
106.
§ 61. Gross income defined
(a) General definition-Except as otherwise provided in the subtitle, gross income
means all income from whatever source derived . . ..
I.R.C. § 61 (1984).
107. Commissioner v. Kowalski, 434 U.S. 77, 78 (1977).
108. Id.
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bursements for sums expended on meals that they would have otherwise eaten inside the station.1" 9 The state troopers were not required
to spend the money on meals during breaks,11 or :o account for how
the money was spent.1"1' There was no reduction of the allowance if
the state trooper failed to work during the period the payments purported to cover."' Moreover, the recruitment brochure described the
cash allowances as an item of salary." 'a The amount received varied
with the state trooper's rank." 4
Before reaching the issue of whether the meals were provided
for the convenience of the employer, the Supreme Court held that §
119 applies only to "meals furnished by the employer and not cash
reimbursements for meals."' 15 Therefore, only meals provided in
kind are excludable from gross income.1 16
In Goldstein v. Commissioner," 7 the court relied on Kowalski
to include in gross income payments made directly to the employee
to supplement her cost of living expenses." 8 Because payments for
lodging were made to the employee in cash, rather than in kind, the
amounts were not excludable under § 119."9
A comparison of the cash payments not excludable under § 119
with payments made directly from one university to another reveals
significant differences. The payments in Kowalski and Goldstein
were made directly to the employees, 12 0 while the faculty members
in Knapp never received any direct reimbursement.' 2 ' The troopers
received the cash disbursements regardless of whether it was spent
on meals or if they were on vacation. 2 2 On the other hand, faculty
members only received tuition assistance if their children attended a
109. Id.at 80.
110. Id.
I1 . Id.
112. Commissioner v. Kowalski, 434 U.S. 77, 80 (1977). For example, "no reduction in
the meal allowance is made for periods when a trooper is not on patrol because . . . he is
assigned to a headquarters building or is away from active duty on vacation, leave, or sick
leave." Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.at 81.
115. Id.at 84.
116. Id. (citing S. Rep. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., 190 (1954)).
117. 73 T.C. 164 (1979).
118. Goldstein v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 164, 167 (1979).
119. Id. at 168.
120. See Commissioner v. Kowalski, 434 U.S. 77, 80 (1977); Goldstein v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 164, 165 (1979).
121. Knapp v. Commissioner, 90 T.C. 430, 431 (1988), aji'd, 867 F.2d 749 (2d Cir.
1989).
122. Kowalski, 434 U.S. at 80.
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university or college. 123 The amount received by the state troopers

varied according to rank."' The amount of tuition assistance did not
vary with a faculty member's salary or tenure position."

5

Moreover,

if a faculty member did not participate in the tuition assistance program, his or her salary was not increased to reflect the difference.

26

Conversely, a faculty member's salary was not reduced if his or her
2

child participated in the program.' 1
These differences lead to the conclusion that the tuition assistance program is a benefit in kind rather than in cash. The program
is a "take it or leave it" type of benefit. The faculty members cannot
receive any other benefit in exchange for not participating in the program. The troopers, however, can use the cash payments to offset
any other expense incurred. Therefore, the troopers have an accession to wealth in the form of cash over which they have complete
dominion.' 2 8 It is clear that the faculty member has an accession to
wealth in that he or she does not have to pay tuition, but it cannot be
said that the faculty member has complete dominion or control over
the payments made. The faculty member never receives the check
nor has any say in how it is spent.
Thus, the payments made from one university to another are
analogous to the tuition remission programs in which the university
does not charge tuition to employees of another school pursuant to a
written agreement. In both types of programs, the employee of a university is not charged tuition for a child's enrollment in another university. In addition, the employee does not receive any cash benefit
over which he or she exercises complete dominion. By including the
tuition payments made in Knapp in the gross income of the employee, the court stressed form over substance. In either a tuition
remission program or a tuition assistance program in which payments are made directly from one university to another, the outcome
is the same: The employee is relieved from the burden of tuition expenses. Because the result is the same in both programs, payments
made from one university to another on behalf of an employee
should be excluded from gross income.
123. Knapp, 90 T.C. at 431.
124, Kowalski, 434 U.S. at 81.
125. Knapp, 90 T.C. at 432.
126. Knapp v. Commissioner, 90 T.C. 430, 432 (1988), affd, 867 F.2d 749 (2d Cir.
1989).
127. Id.
128. Commissioner v. Kowalski, 434 US. 77, 83 (1977) (citing Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass, 348 U.S. 429, 431 (1955)).
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Changes Suggested by Others

It has been suggested that all types of tuition assistance programs should be included in gross income. 129 The purpose of the Tax
Reform Act of 1984 has been characterized as an attempt to "present a permanent solution to the inequitable treatment given cash
and . . . [in kind] compensation. ' 13 But it has been criticized as
merely codifying the historical inequities13 1 by showing preference to
university employees.13 2 The argument is that university employees
can take a large portion of their gross income in the form of tuition
assistance programs. This shifts the cost of the benefit "to all other
taxpayers by way of higher rates on their taxable income." 1 3 The
exclusion of tuition assistance programs from gross income causes an
unjustifiable erosion of the tax base, and children of university em1 34
ployees are educated at the expense of the government.
Another argument is that by exempting tuition assistance to
employees of educational institutions, Congress has denied all other
taxpayers the equal protection of the law. 135 Employees of corporations have argued that educational assistance programs provided by
their employers are similar to those provided by educational institutions.1 36 Because the programs are similar and Congress exempts
from income only the benefits received by employees of educational
institutions, corporate employees argue that this disparate treatment
is barred by the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
7
Amendment.1
Without addressing the merits of either the inequitable treatment argument or the equal protection claims, it is unlikely that
Congress will choose to include in gross income all tuition remission
programs.13 8 As Justice Brennan stated in the Kowalski decision,
129. Wendy Gerzog Shaller, The New Fringe Benefit Legislation: A Codification of
Historical Inequities, 34 CATH. U.L. REv. 425, 443 (1985).
130. Id. at 425.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 427.
133. Id.
134. Shaller, supra note 129, at 444.
135. Wheeler v. United States, 768 F.2d 1333, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474
U.S. 1081 (1986).
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Congress has in fact contemplated and rejected the idea of including tuition remission programs in an employee's gross income. The Internal Revenue Service in November
1976, "singled out tuition remission benefits for professors from all fringe benefits, and announced that these benefits were taxable compensation instead of scholarships. Following a
public hearing two months later, however, the Service announced that this proposed change in
the scholarship regulations was being withdrawn." Shaller, supra note 129, at 430. See also 41
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"arguments of equity have little force in construing the boundaries
of exclusions and deductions from income many of which, to be administrative, must be arbitrary." ' 9
When drafting tax statutes, Congress has an "especially broad
latitude in creating classifications and distinctions.' 4 0 Congress need
only have a rational basis in providing a tax benefit for a particular
class of persons.1 1 One rational basis is that Congress intended to
exempt only tuition assistance payments made to university employees because there is less likelihood of tax avoidance in situations
where there is no direct cash payment to an employee.14 2 Another
rational basis offered is that Congress intended to promote "higher
education by encouraging qualified people to enter and to remain in

the academic teaching profession despite low earnings.

' 43

Since a

rational basis exists, the exclusion of tuition remissions from gross
income will continue.
Any attempt to completely eliminate this benefit offered to employees of educational institutions could be easily thwarted. However, the system in which the universities provide the benefit to their
employees is inadequate. Nearly three hundred universities and colleges are members of an organization called the Tuition Exchange
Program.1 1 4 Each member of the organization agrees, subject to certain criteria, to cancel tuition charges of an employee of another
educational institution that participates in the program." '
Although this non-profit organization provides a much valued
service to the academic community, it has its disadvantages. The disadvantages either limit the availability of the tax benefit, or narrows
the student's choice in selecting a college. One disadvantage is that
not all universities belong to the organization. Although many excellent schools are represented by the Tuition Exchange Program, the
larger universities and Ivy League schools do not participate. "6 The
result is that an employee of a small college whose child is accepted
at a large university or Ivy League school is faced with a difficult
choice. The employee must either send the child to a participating
Fed. Reg. 48,132 (1976) and I.R.S. News Release IR-77-1735.
139. Commissioner v. Kowalski, 434 U.S. 77, 95-96 (1977).
140. Wheeler v. United States, 768 F.2d 1333, 1336-37 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (emphasis
added). cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1081 (1986).
141. Id. at 1337.
142. Id. Wheeler involved payments made by a corporation's educational benefits trust
to the employee's children for college expenses. Id. at 1334.
143. Id. at 1337.
144. Tuition Exchange Program (materials on file at the Dickinson Law Review office).
145. Id. at 2.
146. Id.
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university or pay the income tax on the tuition payments made by its
employer to the large university or Ivy League school. Given the cost
of education today, the amounts paid in tax could be substantial.
There is also no guarantee that an employee will qualify for tuition remittance from a university participating in the organization.
The Tuition Exchange Program involves a system of debits and credits given to each participating member. 14 7 The debits and credits are
based on the number of students within the university participating
in the program. If one university has too many debits, or too many
students, the university cannot accept any more tuition exchange
students. 4" Also, if a university does not receive enough tuition exchange students, its employees cannot participate in the program the
following year.' 4 9 Therefore, not only are students limited in their
choice ofschools by facts extraneous to the program, but there are
problems inherent in the program itself that limit a student's choice
of colleges.
C. Proposal
This Comment proposes that Congress intended to exclude from
gross income payments made from one university to another on behalf of its employees. This is evident from the fact that Congress
codified the preferential treatment historically accorded to employees
of educational institutions. In addition, the nondiscriminatory requirement of § 11 7 evidences Congress' intent to exclude these payments from income.
As noted, Treasury Regulation § 1.117150 first recognized Congress' intent to give preferential treatment to employees of universities by interpreting § 117, as it existed in 1954, to exclude from
income scholarships received in the form of tuition remission. The
United States Supreme Court upheld this interpretation. 5' In 1984,
Congress amended § 117 to exclude any reduction in tuition provided by an employer to an employee if the child attended the employing school or any other educational institution. 52
But at the same time, courts have applied the primary purpose
test to decide whether amounts received as scholarships were ex147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.

Id. at 2.
Id. at 4.
Tuition Exchange Program, supra note 144, at 2.
Treas. Reg. § 1.117-3 (1954).
Bingler v. Johnson, 394 U.S. 741, 751 (1969).
I.R.C. § 117(d) (1984).
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cluded from gross income.15 If the purpose of the grantor is to attract and retain employees, courts deny the exclusion.' 54 If the
amounts received are compensatory in nature or if the employer benefits from the payments, 155 courts deny the exclusion. 5 ' The exclusion is also denied if scholarships granted are linked in any way to
57
the employment of the grantee.
153. For a discussion of the primary purpose test, see supra notes 34-68 and accompanying text. For cases utilizing the primary purpose test to include payments in a taxpayer's
gross income, see generally Wheeler v. United States, 768 F.2d 1333 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (primary purpose of payments was to attract and retain new employees), cert. denied, 474 U.S.
1081 (1986); Saunders v. Commissioner, 720 F.2d 871 (5th Cir. 1983) (primary purpose of
payments was to attract new employees); Meek v. United States, 608 F.2d 368 (9th Cir. 1979)
(primary purpose of the payments was compensation); Armantrout v. Commissioner, 570 F.2d
210 (7th Cir. 1978) (primary purpose of payments was to attract and satisfy key employees);
Ussery v, United States, 296 F.2d 582 (5th Cir. 1961) (primary purpose of the payment was
to train employees to perform their duties more effectively); Western Reserve Academy v.
United States, 619 F. Supp. 394 (N.D. Ohio 1985), aff'd, 801 F.2d 250 (6th Cir. 1986) (primary purpose of payments made by an educational institution was to effectively compete with
other independent secondary schools); Burstein v. United States, 622 F.2d 529 (Ct. Cf. 1980)
(primary purpose of payments was compensation); Yarlott v. Commissioner, 78 T.C. 585
(1982) (primary purpose of payment was to attract talented employees and remain competitive
in the advertising business), affd, 717 F.2d 439 (8th Cir. 1983); Reese v. Commissioner, 45
T.C. 397 (1966) (primary purpose of payment was compensation), afifd, 373 F.2d 742 (4th
Cir. 1967); Heilwell v. United States, 79-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 9559 (E.D. Mich. 1979) (primary
purpose of payment was compensation). But see Krupin v. United States, 439 F. Supp. 440
(E.D. Mo. 1977) (payments made for fellowship program held excludable from income because the benefit of physician's "work accrued to the national academic community rather
than the grantor").
154. See Wheeler v. United States, 768 F.2d 1333 (Fed. Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474
U.S. 1081 (1986); Saunders v. Commissioner, 720 F.2d 871 (5th Cir. 1983); Armantrout v.
Commissioner, 570 F.2d 210 (7th Cir, 1978); Western Reserve Academy v. United States, 619
F. Supp. 394 (N.D. Ohio 1985), aff'd, 801 F.2d 250 (6th Cir. 1986); Grant-Jacoby v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 700 (1980).
155. See Burstein v. United States, 622 F.2d. 529 (Ct. Cl. 1980); Meek v. United
States, 608 F.2d 368 (9th Cir. 1979); Heilwell v. United States, 79-2 U.S. Tax Cas. T 9559
(E.D. Mich. 1979); Yarlott v. Commissioner, 78 T.C. 585 (1982), afTd, 717 F.2d 439 (8th
Cir. 1983); Reese v. Commissioner, 45 T.C. 397 (1966), affd, 373 F.2d 742 (4th Cir. 1967).
156. See generally Saunders v. Commissioner, 720 F.2d 871 (5th Cir. 1983) (payments
were made to improve productivity of workers and enhance employee morale); Cooney v.
United States, 630 F.2d 438 (6th Cir. 1980) (medical residents benefitted the hospital by
supplementing its staff); Meek v. United States, 608 F.2d 368 (9th Cir. 1979) (medical interns
perform services that would otherwise be performed by a resident physician); Armantrout v.
Commissioner, 570 F.2d 210 (7th Cir. 1978) (payments made by a corporation to relieve its
key employees from concern about the high costs of providing a college education thereby
enabling the employees to render better service to the corporation); Ussery v. United States,
296 F.2d 582 (5th Cir. 1961) (Mississippi Department of Public Welfare instituted a program
to train its employees so they could perform their duties more effectively); Yarlott v. Commissioner, 78 T.C. 585 (1982) (university retained a pecuniary interest in royalties produced from
patentable research performed by a medical fellow), affid, 717 F.2d 439 (8th Cir. 1983); Burstein v. United States, 622 F.2d 529 (Ct. Cl. 1980) (clinical services provided by medical
interns receiving stipends were highly valued by the hospital).
157. See generally Wheeler v. United States, 768 F.2d 1333 (Fed Cir. 1985) (children's
right to receive payments was terminated if his or her parent left the corporation), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1081 (1986); Ussery v. United States, 296 F.2d 582 (5th Cir. 1961) (employee
obligated to return to service of former employer upon completion of educational leave); Western Reserve Academy v, United States, 619 F. Supp. 394 (N.D. Ohio 1985) (once faculty
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It is clear that benefits of this kind provided by an educational
institution, whether in the form of tuition remission or payments
made from one university to another, fail the primary purpose test.
The purpose of a university in supplying these berefits is to attract
and retain qualified professors. People interested in the academic
field are aware that salaries are traditionally lower than other fields
of employment, but are encouraged by the existence of tuition assistance benefits. There is clearly an economic benefit to the employee
of a university that is compensatory in nature. Ins-Lead of opting for
a higher paying job to afford the cost of tuition, the faculty member
chooses the lower paying job and is relieved from the burden of paying tuition.
The employer also benefits by the tuition payments offered to
employees. The university receives highly qualified applicants for
their faculty positions as a result of the tuition assistance programs.
The tuition payments are directly linked to the employment of the
parent. Section 117 only excludes from income tuition provided to an
employee of the university. 5 8 Although a child is included as an employee under the Internal Revenue Code, 59 this status is only maintained while his or her parent remains an employee. Therefore, once
the parent is no longer employed by the university,' 60 the tuition
benefit is terminated.
These factors make it evident that tuition benefits provided by
universities fail the primary purpose test and, notwithstanding a specific exemption provided by Congress, should be included in the
gross income of an employee. However, Congress has specifically
carved out an exception for this classification of employees. Congress
did not articulate any particular method for universities to provide
tuition assistance benefits to their employees. 16 ' Moreover, the Treasury Regulation requiring participation in a tuition remittance plan
has not been changed to reflect the amendment enacted by
16 2
Congress.
Since Congress has specifically exempted a benefit that would
members terminated employment with secondary school, they could not apply for an award for
their children for the following academic year), aff'd, 801 F.2d 251) (6th Cir. 1986); GrantJacoby v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 700 (1980) (right to receive payments linked directly to the
continued employment of the father).
158. I.R.C. § l17(d)(1)(A)(B) (1984).
159. I.R.C. § 132(0 (1990).
160. If the employee retires, however, the benefits are still available to the children.
I.R.C. § 132(f) (1990).
161. See I.R.C. § 117(d) (1984).
162. See Treas. Reg. § 1.117 (1990).
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otherwise be included in income, the form in which the university
provides the benefit should not be highly scrutinized. As long as no
payments are directly received by the employee, Congress' intention
to preclude possible tax avoidance, 163 while continuing to promote
higher education, 6 4 will be furthered.
Congress has also chosen to place a non-discrimination requirement on this exemption.'
For the tuition benefits to be exempted
from gross income, it must be available to the faculty members as
well as to the cafeteria employees of the university."6 6 By requiring
non-discrimination, it can be inferred that Congress intended to encourage universities to broaden the scope of tuition assistance programs to all employees. But this intention will be thwarted if payments made from one university to another on behalf of their
employees is not excluded from gross income.
To illustrate, assume that the child of a cafeteria worker employed is accepted at University X. The cost of tuition at X is
$15,000. The cafeteria worker is employed at University Y, which
has no written tuition remission program with University X. A
faculty member's child is also accepted to University X. The faculty
member is also employed at University Y. Assume the cafeteria
worker and the faculty member are taxed on one third of their earnings. If payments made from one university to another on behalf of
their employees are excluded from income, both children can attend
University X. But if the payments are not excluded, it is quite possible that the cafeteria worker cannot afford to pay $5,000 in taxes.
The faculty member, because of his position with the university, is
financially able to afford the $5,000 in taxes. The result is that the
highly compensated employee's child attends the university of
choice, while the cafeteria worker's child is relegated to attend a university that has a written tuition remittance program with his or her
parent's university. This result undermines the purpose of the nondiscriminatory requirement. If payments made from one university
to another are excluded from gross income, all employees will stand
on equal grounds when receiving tuition payments. Thus, the legislative purpose underlying the nondiscrimination requirement will be
satisfied.
163.
U.S. 1081
164.
165.
166,

Wheeler v. United States, 768 F.2d 1333, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474
(1986).
Id.
I.R.C. § 117(d)(3) (1984).
See id.
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Conclusion

Congress enacted § 117 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954
to end the confusion surrounding the tax status of scholarships. The
primary purpose test has been utilized to determine if payments
characterized as scholarships should be excluded from gross income.
If the purpose of the grantor is to compensate the recipient of the
payment, the exclusion is generally denied. It is apparent that tuition
assistance payments made by a university on behalf of its employees
are compensatory in nature. These payments fail the primary purpose test and should be included in gross income, unless specifically
exempted by Congress.
Congress has chosen to exempt from income any qualified tuition reduction. By exempting payments that are clearly compensatory, Congress has carved out a specific exemption for a particular
class of employees. Because this exemption has been recognized by
Congress, the form in which the benefit is provided should not be
highly scrutinized.
Section 117 as amended by the Tax Reform Act of 1984 should
be interpreted as excluding from income tuition payments made directly from one university to another. Payments in this form are
analogous to an in kind benefit rather than an in cash benefit. Congress has also placed a nondiscriminatory requirement on this exemption. If tuition payments made from one university to another
are exempt from income, Congress' intent to encourage universities
to offer the benefit to all employees will be furthered.
Congress has attempted to promote higher education by offering
an income tax exemption to employees of educational institutions.
Courts should not second guess Congress by stressing form over substance when examining the tuition assistance payments provided to
university employees.
John Nevin Kennedy

